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Many studies have assessed threat theory by investigating the 
relationships between the size of minority populations and police 
strength. Yet these investigations analyzed older data with cross-
sectional designs. This study uses a fixed-effects panel design to detect 
nonlinear and interactive relationships between minority presence and 
the per capita number of police in large U.S. cities in the last three 
census years. The findings show that the relationship between racial 
threat and the population-corrected number of police officers has 
recently become considerably stronger. In accord with theoretically 
based expectations, tests for interactions show that segregated cities with 
larger African American populations have smaller departments. The 
coefficients on another interaction effect suggest that racial segregation 
leads to reductions in police strength in the South perhaps because 
officers are less likely to intervene in residentially isolated black 
neighborhoods in this region. 
 
*  The authors are grateful to the NSF (Grant # SES-0417736) for partial support for 
this project, to the editor for his patience, and to Brian Stultz for supplying his data 
on residential segregation. All data used in these analyses are available on request. 
Comments regarding this paper should be addressed to David Jacobs, Department 
of Sociology, 300 Bricker, 190 North Oval Mall, Ohio State University, Columbus, 
OH 43210. 
 What is the relationship between the presence of racial minorities in 
large U.S. cities and the strength of police departments, and how does this 
relationship fluctuate over time? In comparison to other nations, race 
relations throughout U.S. history have been exceptionally antagonistic and 
violent (de Tocqueville, 1835/1948; Myrdal, 1944), and this racial violence 
was not confined to the civil war that occurred almost 150 years ago. 
Immediately after that war and for more than 80 years following, 
vigilantes lynched blacks to maintain a racial caste system (Tolnay and 
Beck, 1996). More recently, the conventional public wisdom has viewed 
urban violence as almost entirely due to racial and ethnic minorities 
(Chiricos, Welch and Gertz, 2004). Multiple findings suggest that majority 
whites, apparently threatened by the presence of large minority 
populations (Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Taylor, 1998), often make 
successful political demands for additional police officers in cities with the 
most minority residents (Jacobs, 1979, Liska, Lawrence and Bensen, 1981; 
Jackson, 1989). 
Some characteristics of police work help explain why this independent 
relationship is often reported. Due to chronic uncertainties, the behavior 
of officers on the street is primarily reactive rather than proactive (Wilson, 
1971; Rubenstein, 1973; Ericson, 1982, 1989). Police officers are not 
abundant in relation to the populations they must control (Sherman, 
1992). Because officers cannot read minds nor see into buildings, they find 
it difficult to identify recent law breakers or those who are about to 
commit such acts (Rubenstein, 1973; Ericson, 1982, 1989). Choices about 
who to stop must be made on the basis of anomalies and crude decision 
rules (Weitzer and Tuch, 2002; Lundman and Kaufman, 2003). These 
decisions, because they are based on group rather than individual 
characteristics, often result in statistical discrimination (Rubenstein, 1973; 
Ericson, 1982, 1989). Officers also face special handicaps in underclass 
neighborhoods because street criminals and the innocent share many 
characteristics in such districts. 
But if the police are particularly numerous relative to a city’s 
population, their reliance on anomalies should make them more effective 
in white neighborhoods, where residents tend to be visibly distinct from 
minority street criminals (Jacobs, 1979; Manning, 1994). Even if the police 
do not make unwarranted efforts to please whites, whites should benefit 
from larger departments. It is plausible that the geographic boundaries  
insulating white neighborhoods from underclass street criminals should be 
less permeable in cities with a higher ratio of officers. This logic suggests 
that additional officers should be present in communities when white 
anxieties about crime are magnified by substantial minority populations 
(Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico, 1982; Quillian and Pager, 2001). Yet the 
studies that tested this relationship suffered from some important 
difficulties that we hope to correct with a pooled time-series research 
design. 
Multiple studies have assessed the relationship between racial or ethnic 
minorities and police strength (Jacobs, 1979; Liska et al., 1981; Jackson, 
1989), yet almost all were cross-sectional. Shifts in the strength of the 
association between minority presence and the number of police officers 
could not be detected. Greenberg, Kessler and Loftin (1985) used a panel 
design, but they entered explanatory variables from the previous census to 
account for police strength a decade later. Such a long lag is implausible: it 
should not take ten years for these relationships to be completed. 
Greenberg and his colleagues included a lagged dependent variable on the 
right side of their models, yet both correlated measurement error between 
the dependent variable and its lag and serial correlation weakened the 
coefficients on the other explanatory variables. Most of the cities in the 
Greenberg sample were smaller than those in studies finding greater 
support for racial threat. This reduced support is not surprising, given that 
the literature suggests that informal control is more effective in small 
cities. Racially threatened whites therefore have greater reasons to 
demand additional police officers in the larger cities analyzed in most of 
the literature. Although race mattered in only some of their analyses, 
methodological problems suggest that the Greenberg findings should be 
reexamined. 
The literature has additional gaps. Despite some of the implications of 
threat theory, few tests for interactive relationships have been conducted, 
and there may be problems with omitted variable bias. We have not 
located studies that analyzed data after 1990.  In the absence of such 
studies we do not know if the association between minority presence and 
police strength persists or if it has recently become stronger. In contrast to 
the Greenberg et al. study, we use a less questionable pooled time-series, 
fixed-effects approach to disentangle the interactive, nonlinear and 
fluctuating relationships between African American or Hispanic presence 
and the population corrected number of police officers in U.S. cities in the 
last three census years.1 Although we test hypotheses derived from other 
 
 1. In comparison to cross-sectional approaches, pooled time-series cross-sectional 
alternatives offer multiple benefits. The combination of multiple cross-sections 
expands the number of cases. One result is that variable variance is increased and 
multicollinearity typically is reduced in such designs. In comparison to pure cross-
sectional research designs, pooled time-series cross-sectional approaches therefore 
offer increased statistical power and all of the other inferential benefits that come 
with larger samples. And the fixed-effects procedure that can be used in pooled 
designs provides an effective way to reduce problems with omitted variable bias 
that plague non experimental research. In addition to these advantages, controls 
for period let researchers test for time-specific interactions. Such specifications can 
uncover historically contingent relationships by detecting associations between 
theoretical perspectives, our primary goal is to provide superior tests of 
refinements to the racial threat version of conflict theory. 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
MINORITY THREAT 
Racial fissures once were and probably still are the most important 
social and political division in the United States. These schisms may 
explain alterations in law and order measures such as the number of police 
officers in large cities, because the threat posed by comparatively 
substantial minority groups should produce increasingly severe measures 
against street crime. Both sociologists and political scientists have 
provided the conceptual foundation for this threat account (Key, 1949; 
Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). Ethnocentric 
beliefs and dominant group tendencies to view minorities as interlopers 
strengthen dominant group presumptions that they should have exclusive 
claims over important rights and privileges (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  
Majority groups’ entrenched beliefs about their “rightful” position and 
their unfavorable opinions about minorities emerge from the political 
struggles that occur when minorities seek more equitable distributions 
(Blumer, 1958). Larger minority populations jeopardize the political and 
cultural ascendancy of majority groups, who frequently react by 
supporting political measures that are designed to help them maintain 
their privileged position. 
This presence of hostile views about minorities provides one of the 
conceptual links between the threat posed by large minority populations 
and law and order outcomes. Negative opinions about blacks are more 
likely in areas with larger black populations (Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; 
Taylor, 1998). As one might expect, relatively substantial minority 
populations produce increased white votes for anti-minority candidates 
(Giles and Buckner, 1993; Giles and Hertz, 1994). Findings also show that 
majority whites express greater anxieties about criminal victimization in 
communities with more black residents. With crime rates held constant, 
both Liska et al. (1982) and Quillian and Pager (2001) find independent 
positive relationships between the percentage of blacks in cities or in 
neighborhoods and fear of crime. 
In light of these results, it should not be surprising that multiple studies 
support the next link in this causal chain by suggesting that the anxieties 
and resentments that arise from minority threat lead dominant ethnic 
 
explanatory and dependent variables that differ in strength by period (see 
Kennedy, 2003 for a more extensive discussion of these and other benefits). 
groups to pressure political authorities to make greater efforts to control 
street crime. A longitudinal analysis suggests that growth in the presence 
of nonwhites leads to subsequent increases in spending on prisons and jails 
(Jacobs and Helms, 1999). Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) use fixed-effects 
estimation and find that U.S. states with the most substantial African 
American and Hispanic populations have higher imprisonment rates. Such 
results and the repeated cross-sectional findings showing that cities with 
large minority populations either have more police officers relative to 
their population (Jacobs, 1979; Huff and Stahure, 1980; Liska et al., 1981) 
or spend larger amounts on the police (Jackson and Carroll, 1981; Jackson, 
1989) combine to suggest that: The per capita number of police officers will 
be greater in cities with the most substantial percentages of black residents. 
In some cities Hispanics are largest underclass minority, so the same logic 
leads to an expectation that: The per capita number of police officers will 
be greater in cities with the largest percentage of Hispanic residents. 
But the relationship between Hispanic presence and police size may not 
be linear. In many cities outside the southwest, the percentage of 
Hispanics is extremely modest. The median percentage in our sample, for 
example, was 4.9 percent but the median percentage of blacks was 20.9 
percent. Because the Hispanic population was so small in so many cities, it 
is plausible that this minority must reach a threshold size before majority 
whites consider this group as sufficiently threatening. We therefore predict 
that: the nonlinear relationship between the percentage of Hispanic residents 
and the per capita number of police officers should become positive after 
the relative size of this ethnic minority reaches a level that threatens majority 
whites. 
Yet the relationships between minority threat due to larger black 
populations and law enforcement strength may not be additive. Social 
outcomes often depend on the joint appearance of more than one set of 
conditions that each of must be present in sufficient strength. Another 
implication of threat theory can be assessed by assessing the interactive 
effects of residential segregation. We start with the additive component by 
hypothesizing that: whites should not feel as menaced by larger black 
populations when residential segregation is pronounced. We thus expect 
that enhanced residential separations between the races should reduce the 
population-corrected police presence, but this relationship may be present 
only in cities with relatively large African American populations. 
Racial threat theory therefore suggests an interactive relationship 
between percentage of African Americans and residential segregation, 
particularly if police departments are less likely to interfere in black affairs 
when this minority is isolated from whites. Studies suggest that segregation 
reduces racial threat because relatively separated neighborhoods make 
blacks less threatening to whites. This residential isolation lowers arrest 
 probabilities (Stolzenberg, D’Alessio and Eitle, 2004; Liska, Chamlin and 
Read, 1985; Liska and Chamlin, 1984) in part because segregation reduces 
white victimization by African American street criminals (Liska and 
Chamlin, 1984). Such declines in white victimization should alleviate white 
pressure on political authorities to do something about crimes committed 
by blacks (Stolzenberg et al., 2004: 676). If this logic is correct and 
departments are not likely to police ghetto neighborhoods as vigorously 
when residential segregation is pronounced, the most racially segregated 
cities need not have as many officers as their less segregated counterparts. 
With main effects held constant we therefore expect that: when residential 
segregation and the percentage of blacks are both substantial, the per capita 
number of police officers should be reduced. This proposition implies that 
the coefficient on an interaction term based on the product of residential 
segregation and city percentages of African Americans should be 
negative. 
Another contingent relationship is equally plausible. James Q. Wilson 
(1971: 141) talks about police departments that avoid enforcing the law, 
particularly in minority neighborhoods, unless behavior in such 
neighborhoods offends high-status whites. The police in these cities 
assume that blacks both want and deserve “less law enforcement because 
to the police their conduct suggests a low level of private morality, an 
unwillingness to cooperate with the police or offer information, and 
widespread criminality.” Such departments largely ignore African 
Americans “because they have no influence and their conduct, except 
within broad limits is not thought to be self regulating” (141). 
Such views should be most common in the South. It seems likely as well 
that a policy of reduced law enforcement in the ghetto should be least 
offensive to high-status whites when residential segregation is most intense 
and whites have less contact with blacks. Because departments that avoid 
intervening in the ghetto need not be as large as their counterparts that 
vigorously police the ghetto, the most residentially segregated cities in the 
South should therefore have fewer police officers.  This hypothesis suggests 
that the coefficient on an interaction term calculated on the product of 
residential segregation and location in the South should also be negative. 
It follows that a larger African American presence ought to produce 
additional police officers, but racially segregated southern cities or highly 
segregated cities with the most black residents should have fewer officers 
relative to their population. 
Finally, the pooled time-series approach we use in this analysis can 
address another important issue. Due in part to the increased emphasis on 
the racial aspects of departures from law and order in political campaigns 
during the period at issue (Edsal and Edsal, 1991; Beckett, 1997; Stucky, 
Heimer and Lang, 2005), perhaps the magnitude of the association 
between racial threat and police strength has increased. According to 
Beckett, increases in strident political claims about street crime during this 
period enhanced the public salience of the racial aspects of law and order 
and contributed to enhanced resentments against black street criminals 
(1997). Findings support such claims as indicators of the political strength 
of the political party that emphasized law and order and minority presence 
became stronger predictors of imprisonment rates in the states during this 
period (Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001). To gauge equivalent shifts in the 
intensity of the relationship between minority presence and police 
strength, we enter interactions between African American presence and 
period. If the association between racial threat and police strength became 
more substantial from 1980 to 2000, we can expect to find positive 
coefficients on interaction terms calculated with the product of the 
percentage of blacks and the dummy variables we use to capture otherwise 
unmeasured period effects on police strength. 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTS 
Spending on police departments represents a substantial share of 
municipal revenues, so political explanations should matter. Although 
city-level political measures are not abundant, one institutional 
arrangement ought to be influential. In the early part of the 20th century, 
government by unelected city manager was championed by upper middle 
class progressives who sought to depoliticize municipal administration and 
reduce the power of the urban political machines supported by new 
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe. Progressives claimed that 
appointed managers—who would not be subject to the whims of 
unsophisticated voters or induced to win their votes with corrupt 
practices—would be more likely to make efficient decisions. One analysis 
suggests that the process we study is at least partially political as 
expansions in police employees are greater in local election years (Levitt, 
1997). Another finds that municipalities with a city manager are 
dominated by well-educated citizens (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998). Such 
upper middle class communities should be less responsive to racially 
motivated public demands for law and order. And city administrators who 
do not face the voters can better resist media driven panics about street 
crime and the resulting public pressures to hire additional but unnecessary 
officers. For these reasons, we expect fewer police officers in cities with a 
city manager. 
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 
Garland claims that enhanced public demands for law and order are 
produced by social disorganization (2000). This condition may account 
for stronger police departments after crime rates have been held 
constant. Some violence and other threatening acts that result from 
social disorganization may not be captured by the crime rates, but these 
unruly acts may lead to enhanced public anxieties and added political 
pressure to hire more officers (Tyler and Boeckman, 1997; Garland, 
2001). Holding such factors constant is important because jurisdictions 
with larger minority populations may hire new law enforcement 
personnel, but not necessarily due to minority threat. Instead, public 
anxieties and resentments arising from social disorganization are likely 
to appear in cities where underclass minority populations are most 
substantial. If disorganization effects are not held constant, we could not 
rule out the possibility that citizens, when they successfully pressure 
political authorities to hire more officers, are responding to the unruly 
acts due to social disorganization rather than to minority threat. These 
considerations suggest that cities with larger percentages of families 
below the poverty line or with higher divorce rates will have more 
officers. Divorce rates should be especially influential because the police 
often must intervene in violent domestic disputes, but this relationship 
may not be linear because these rates may only produce additional 
police officers after a threshold in these rates is reached. To capture 
another dimension of social disorganization, we hold constant crowding 
or the proportion of dwelling units with more than 1.01 persons per 
room. 
ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Police services represent a significant drain on municipal budgets. 
Because police work is labor intensive, at least 80 percent of department 
funds are spent on officer wages. It follows that the number of officers 
should partly depend on the tax base. In this study we do not use the 
department percentage of city revenues to capture this effect. Although 
city governments can decide to increase taxes in order to hire additional 
officers, such decisions are constrained by the resources available to be 
taxed. The point is that if political demands for expansions in the number 
of officers are sufficiently intense, cities could secure the necessary 
revenue by increasing taxes, but the proportion of city revenues spent on 
law enforcement could remain constant. The resources that can be taxed, 
however, ultimately depend on resident incomes. We deliberately assess 
actual resource constraints using city income levels rather than the more 
discretionary proportion of city revenues spent on the police.  
 Studies of criminal punishment have repeatedly focused on the neo-
Marxist hypothesis that punishment is used to control the excess supply of 
labor in capitalist societies (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939). Many 
investigations assessed the link between unemployment and incarceration, 
but the results have been inconclusive. A literature review, for example, 
shows that only about 60 percent of the 147 associations between 
unemployment and imprisonments are significant and positive (Chiricos 
and Delone, 1992). In spite of such mixed findings, it is reasonable to 
expect that high joblessness rates will produce expansions in police officers 
because high status politically influential citizens may view the 
unemployed as a threat to social order (Chambliss, 1964) or because 
substantial unemployment leads to resentments against underclass 
criminals and thus magnifies public demands for additional law 
enforcement capacity. 
It is important to examine the explanatory power of city size because 
the likelihood of successfully identifying criminal offenders is enhanced in 
the smallest cities (Jackson, 1984; Mayhew and Levinger, 1976). The 
resulting enforcement difficulties in large municipalities suggest that 
departments should have more officers relative to their population in the 
most populous communities. Finally, because the number of officers 
should be greater in cities with higher crime rates, we examine the 
explanatory power of the property and the violent crime rates. But many 
of these crimes may not be important enough to influence police strength. 
Because the far more serious homicides should produce greater anxieties, 
the murder rates rather than the violent or the property crime rates should 
be included in the models as well. The homicide rates are measured with 
greater accuracy than the other index crimes reported in the Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCRs), but these rates may have a nonlinear relationship 
with the number of police officers. Perhaps, after these rates have gone 
past a threshold, additional homicides will substantially enhance the 
probability of successful public demands for additional officers. 
METHODOLOGY 
SAMPLE 
Due to severe limits on data availability in off census years, we analyze 
the determinants of police strength in 1980, 1990 and 2000 in U.S. cities 
that had populations greater than 100,000 in 1980. Using separated periods 
in a pooled time-series analysis is advantageous because such a sampling 
procedure reduces serial correlation and the effects of measurement error 
(Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Pooled time-series cross-sectional 
estimators are robust to shifts in the number of cases included in different 
 periods (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Wooldridge 2002), but in this 
instance few such differences are present. The number of cities included in 
this analysis in 1980 and in 1990 is 125, but falls to 123 in the 2000 cross-
section, leaving 373 city-years in all analyses. 
ESTIMATION 
In contrast to the random-effects approach used in most panel analyses 
in criminology, the fixed-effects alternative holds constant any unchanging 
case attributes by (in effect) entering separate dummy variables for each 
city. This makes fixed-effects estimates unbiased when unmeasured time-
invariant city characteristics associated with the explanatory variables 
influence the dependent variable. In comparison to random-effects, 
stronger claims can be made that omitted variables are not distorting such 
estimates (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002; see Kennedy, 
2003 for an enumeration of additional statistical advantages). These case-
specific dummy variables used in fixed-effects analyses represent different 
intercepts for each city. Such city-specific intercepts will capture any 
unchanging city differences in the number of police officers that are 
idiosyncratic. For instance, regional effects are automatically held constant 
in fixed-effects models. We also control for otherwise unmeasured period 
shocks that may have influenced police strength in many cities by 
including time-specific dummy variables in the models (for precedent, see 
Eitle, D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2002; Kent and Jacobs, 2004). The 
relationships at issue therefore will be estimated with two-way fixed-
effects models in part because Hausman tests indicate that fixed-effects 
and random-effects estimates differ significantly. 
MEASUREMENT 
We measure racial threat with the natural log of the percentage of 
African Americans (some variables are in natural log form to reduce 
outliers and heteroskedasticity). Ethnic threat is measured with the 
percentage of Hispanics.2 Residential segregation is assessed with the 
index of dissimilarity based on the odds that any black will come into 
contact with any white. City manager presence is captured with a dummy 
variable coded 1 for cities with this arrangement. We gauge the tax base 
with real (corrected for inflation) median family income, and include the 
 
 2. Because Hispanics are concentrated in the Southwest, in this paper we emphasize 
racial rather than Hispanic threat. Although this analysis of all large cities will 
provide some theoretically interesting findings about Hispanic threat, a study that 
focuses on the menace of Hispanics probably should be restricted to a sample of 
large cities in the Southwest and in the West. 
 natural log of FBI violent and property crime rates in some models and 
the murder rates and their square in others. We measure social 
disorganization with percentage divorced, the natural log of the 
percentage of families with incomes below the poverty line, and the 
natural log of the percentage of dwelling units with more than 1.01 persons 
per room.3 Population is included in these models to capture the 
independent effects of city size. 
Period effects that may influence department strength across all cities in 
a particular year are held constant by including two dummy variables 
coded 1 for 1990 and for 2000. To assess the degree to which the 
relationship between the percentage of blacks and police strength 
fluctuates, in some models we include two interaction terms calculated 
with the products of the two period dummy variables and the percentage 
of African Americans. We expect that the racial threat relationship has 
become stronger, so the coefficients on these two interaction terms should 
be positive. Recall that additional interaction terms include the product of 
the percentage of blacks and racial segregation along with the product of 
racial segregation and a dummy variable coded 1 for southern cities. All 
required main effects are entered in models that assess the explanatory 
power of interactions.4 
The percentage of African Americans and the segregation rates are 
mean centered before they are multiplied to create the interaction terms. 
In models that gauge interaction effects, the coefficient on a mean 
centered main effect represents this variable’s additive contribution when 
the alternative mean centered main effect is equal to its mean. If mean 
centering is not used, the coefficient on each main effect depicts the 
additive relationship between that main effect and the dependent variable 
when the value of the alternative main effect is equal to zero. In addition 
 
 3. We include the percentage below the poverty line in part because measures of 
income inequality are not available (the census stopped supplying the Gini index 
for cities after 1980). City scores on the Gini index, however, are closely associated 
with the percentage below the poverty line as findings suggest that most of the 
variation in the Gini index is due to the gap between lower and middle income 
recipients (Jacobs 1980). 
 4. To produce the most accurate results, we follow the advice of econometricians and 
include many controls in the models. For example, Johnston says "it is more serious 
to omit relevant variables than to include irrelevant variables since in the former 
case the coefficients will be biased, the disturbance variance overestimated, and 
conventional inference procedures rendered invalid, while in the latter case the 
coefficients will be unbiased, the disturbance variance properly estimated, and the 
inference procedures properly estimated. This constitutes a fairly strong case for 
including rather than excluding relevant variables in equations. There is, however, 
a qualification. Adding extra variables, be they relevant or irrelevant, will lower the 
precision of estimation of the relevant coefficients"  (1984: 262). Inclusive 
specifications thus tend to produce more conservative significance tests. 
 to its contribution to clarity, centering is methodologically useful as it 
helps to reduce collinearity between main effects and the interaction term 
(Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2003). 
We follow past researchers and measure the dependent variable with 
the number of sworn police officers per 100,000 population (Jacobs, 1979). 
To provide time for the relationships in question to be completed, the 
number of officers is measured in the year after a decennial census. This 
variable also is in natural log form to reduce problems with outliers and 
heteroskedasticity. 
SPECIFICATION 
Theoretical considerations suggest that, except for the negative 
relationship we expect between city managers and police strength, the 
coefficients on all remaining linear effects save those not theorized should 
be positive. We expect that the percentage of Hispanics, the divorce rate, 
and the murder rates will only produce additional police officers after 
these factors reach levels that produce enhanced demands for law and 
order. If expansions after an inflection point produce increased police 
strength, the coefficients on the square of these three variables should be 
positive. 
A general specification of these fixed-effects models is: 
POLICE OFFICERS PER POPt  =  b0 + b1%BLACKt-1  +  b2(%BLACKt-1  x  
YR1990 t-1) + b3(%BLACKt-1  x YR2000 t-1) + b4(%BLACKt-1  x SEGREGATIONt-1) + 
b5(SEGREGATIONt-1 x SOUTHt-1) + b6%HISPANICt-1 + b7%HISPANIC
2
t-1 + b8MURDER 
RATESt-1 + b9MURDER RATES
2
t-1+ b10CITYMANAGER t-1 + b11MEDIANINCt-1 + 
b12POVERTYt-1  + b13DIVORCERATEt-1+ b14DIVORCERATE
2
t-1+ b15CROWDINGt-1 
+ b16SEGREGATIONt-1 + b17POPt-1  + b18YEAR1990 + b19YEAR2000 + e. (1) 
with all variables defined as above. Because regional effects are captured 
by the city specific dummy variables (whose coefficients will not be shown 
in the tables), the required main effects are represented by b1, b16, b18, and 
b19. Because we predict signs, all significance tests save those on the period 
dummies and the intercepts are one-tailed. 
ANALYSES 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CROSS-TABULATION 
Table 1 shows the expected signs, the variable means, and their 
standard deviations. The per capita number of police officers in these 
cities has grown in each of the three periods we analyze. In 1981 this mean 
was 216.2 officers per 100,000 population, yet by 1991 it had risen to 230.6 
 and by 2001 to 255.6. Officers per 100,000 city residents ranged from 108.5 
in Anchorage, Alaska in 1991 to 756.8 in Washington, DC in the same 
year. An inspection of these rankings suggests that smaller, socially 
homogeneous communities have the fewest officers relative to their 
populations, but the large, racially diverse older cities seem to have the 
most.5  To provide an intuitive picture of how police strength covaries with 
three important explanatory variables, Table 2 shows mean police strength 
cross-classified by the percentage of African Americans, the percentage of 
Hispanics and by the presence of a city manager. Relevant comparisons 
always support our expectations about race as all cell means increase in 
rows with larger percentages of African Americans. But these contrasts 
imply that Hispanic presence may not have as much explanatory power as 
race. Compared to cities without a city manager, mean officers are 
substantially reduced if cities have this political arrangement. These simple 
comparisons may not persist after many additional factors are held 
constant in the fixed-effects analyses, but they nevertheless imply that 
some of our most important suppositions are correct. The correlation 
matrix presented in Table 3 shows that these associations are relatively 
modest.  
 
Table 1. Predicted Signs, Means, and Standard Deviations  
(N = 373 city-years) 
Variable Prediction Mean SD 
Ln police per 100,000  5.394 .341 
Ln % black + 2.773 1.021 
Segregation rate + 59.852 14.521 
% Hispanic + 11.197 13.941 
% unemployed + 1.795 .443 
Real median income  + 414.018 79.402 
1 if city manager - .424 .495 
% divorced + 10.680 2.190 
Murder rate + 16.134 12.827 
Ln % poverty  + 2.537 .396 
Ln crowding + 1.556 .605 
Population per 100,000 + 4.287 7.816 
 
 
 5. Socially homogeneous cities with the fewest officers per 100,000 include Fresno CA 
(114.2 in 1990), Modesto CA (117.8 in 1980), Anaheim CA (121.5 in 2000), and 
Eugene OR (123.5 in 2000). Cities with the most included Baltimore MD (507.5 in 
2000), Honolulu HI (517.3 in 2000), Las Vegas NV (533.3 in 1980), and Washington 
DC (630.5 in 2000). Other older large cities such as New York and Chicago had 
comparatively large police departments as well. 
 Table 2. Mean Police Officers per 100,000 Cross-Classified  
  Cities without a City Manager Cities with a City Manager 
  % Hispanic % Hispanic 
  Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
        
 Low 156.4 213.0 195.3 151.5 177.2 158.4 
  (16) (15) (9) (9) (12) (36) 
Moderate 205.5 234.7 287.3 195.5 211.8 191.5 
 (36) (29) (22) (6) (20) (21) 
High 267.9 337.4 357.2 252.1 244.4 268.4 
 (42) (29) (17) (28) (19) (7) 
%
 B
la
ck
 
 Anova F test =  
43.0  p < .000 
    
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the number of city-years in a cell, N = 373 city-
years 
 
FIXED-EFFECTS RESULTS 
To facilitate comparisons, we begin with a basic specification presented 
in Model 1 in Table 4. Although racial effects are included in the first 
model, we (temporarily) ignore nonlinear and interaction effects. In 
Model 2 we enter interactions between period and the percentage of 
African Americans to discover whether the relationship between racial 
threat and police strength has shifted in the last two decades. Recall that 
this test is conducted by multiplying the 1990 and 2000 period dummy 
variables by the percentage of blacks. If the coefficients on these two 
interaction terms are significant with the main effects held constant, we 
can conclude that the magnitude of this racial threat relationship has 
expanded or contracted in that period. In this model we also introduce 
Hispanic presence and its square along with a similar quadratic test of 
divorce rate effects to capture nonlinear relationships. In Model 3 in Table 
4 we add the property and the violent crime rates to the explanatory 
variables included in Model 2.  
The results in Model 1 suggest that the most residentially segregated 
cities with higher unemployment rates have more police officers relative to 
their populations. As expected, however, city manager presence leads to 
reductions in police strength. Yet absent tests for period specific 
interactions, the presence of blacks has no effect on this outcome. The 
significance tests on the two period-specific dummy variables indicate that 
there is sufficient overtime variation in the dependent variable to estimate 
with fixed-effects. 
Table 3.  Correlation Matrix (N = 373 city-years) 
      Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Ln police per 100,000 1.000             
2 Ln % black .576 1.000            
3 Segregation rate  .474 .686 1.000           
4 % Hispanic -.094 -.279 -.161 1.000          
5 % unemployed .143 .284 .324 -.006 1.000         
6 Real median income -.279 -.394 -.422 -.032 -.614 1.000        
7 1 if city manager -.308 -.153 -.202 .221 -.081 .063 1.000       
8 % divorced -.177 -.117 -.163 -.086 -.189 .058 .172 1.000      
9 Murder rate .429 .569 .540 -.042 .417 -.440 -.107 -.012 1.000     
10 Ln % poverty .469 .610 .448 .189 .547 -.783 -.102 -.121 .529 1.000    
11 Ln crowding .160 .070 .101 .708 .052 .015 .172 -.112 .279 .318 1.000   
12 Population .253 .097 .279 .226 .061 .018 -.134 -.204 .154 .127 .329 1.000  
13 1 if 1990 -.034 .007 -.008 -.017 .347 -.044 -.011 -.005 .107 .126 -.024 -.002 1.000
14 1 if 2000 .177 .045 -.259 .182 -.549 .269 -.001 .250 -.199 .056 .203 .029 -.498
       
 
 
Table 4. Pooled Time-Series Models 1–3, Ln. Police Officers per 
100,000 in Large Cities 
Explanatory 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
1 if 1990  .0487*** .0159 .0044 .0169 .0121 .0187 
1 if 2000 .1977*** .0297 .0950** .0337 .1064*** .0344 
Real median income -.0002 .0002 .0005* .0002 .0005* .0002 
Ln % unemployed  .0676* .0315 .0850** .0298 .0759** .0305 
Segregation rate .0028* .0016 -.0004 .0014 -.0003 .0015 
Population / 10
6 -.0026 .0113 .0208** .0081 .0226** .0083 
1 if city manager  -.1254** .0534 -.2651*** .0710 -.2651*** .0708 
Ln % black  .0893 .0565 .1910*** .0542 .1901*** .0532 
Ln % black in 1990  — — .0485*** .0109 .0479*** .0109 
Ln % black in 2000  — — .0932*** .0132 .0904*** .0134 
% divorced  — — -.0776** .0304 -.0764** .0292 
% divorced
2  — — .0047*** .0014 .0046*** .0013 
% Hispanic  — — -.0115*** .0034 -.0113*** .0034 
% Hispanic
2 — — .0002*** .0001 .0002*** .0001 
Ln violent crime  
rate — — — — -.0211 .0271 
Ln property crime 
rate — — — — .0445 .0336 
Intercept 5.3374*** .1209 5.3622*** .2098 5.1134*** .2932 
R2 (corrected) .912***  .938***  .938***  
AIC -804    -932     -930  
Significance:  * < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001 (standard errors to the right of coefficients;  
1-tailed tests on all coefficients except the intercepts and period 
dummy variables; standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity). 
Note:  N = 373 city-years; coefficients on city dummies not shown 
 
In Model 2 we find that the percentage of Hispanics, and the divorce 
rate have nonlinear relationships with the dependent variable. As 
expected, both variables must reach thresholds before police strength 
starts to expand (we defer reporting inflection points until the discussion 
of the best model.) But the most important contrast between Model 1 and 
Model 2 concerns racial effects. When the coefficient on the percentage of 
blacks is not forced to be identical in different periods, the explanatory 
power of racial threat sharply increases. These interactions between racial 
threat and period suggest that the association between black presence and 
police strength became stronger in both 1990 and 2000. The reduction in 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) score for Model 2 suggests that this 
specification has much greater explanatory power than the specification 
used in Model 1. In the last model in Table 4, we add the property and 
violent crime rates, but the results show that although the explanatory 
variables that were significant in Model 2 continue to matter, neither of 
these perhaps overly aggregated crime rates explains police strength. 
 We still need to discover whether other interaction effects 
influence police department strength. Theory suggests that the number of 
officers should differ in segregated cities with larger percentages of blacks 
or in segregated cities in the South. In light of the weak influence of the 
aggregated crime rates, we also should use the murder rates in place of 
these combined rates. In Model 4 in Table 5 we start by entering an 
interaction between residential segregation and the percentage of blacks 
and we replace the aggregated crime rates with the murder rates and their 
square. In Model 5 we add an interaction between residential segregation 
and city location in the South. Recall from the theoretical discussion that 
residentially segregated cities with larger black populations should need 
fewer officers if racial separation reduces black threat. The same 
prediction about police strength reductions should hold when the 
interaction between residential segregation and city location in the South 
is assessed. Finally, in Model 6 we add crowding and the poverty rates to 
capture otherwise unmeasured social disorganization effects.  
The findings in Model 4 suggest that expansions in the murder rates 
explain police strength, but the murder rates do not produce additional 
officers until they reach a threshold. The coefficient on the interaction 
between the percentage of black residents and residential segregation 
supports a supposition that the most racially segregated cities with the 
largest black populations are likely to have fewer police officers relative to 
their population. After we add the interaction between residential 
segregation and location in the South in Model 5, we find strong evidence 
that residential separation between the races reduces police strength in 
this region. The substantial reduction in the AIC statistic suggests that the 
inclusion of this interaction term produces a sizeable increase in model 
explanatory power. Finally in Model 6 in Table 5, we add the percentage 
of families below the poverty line and the percentage of dwelling units 
with more than 1.01 persons per room, but the results suggest that these 
indicators of social disorganization have no effects on police strength. 
We use the point estimates from the best model (see Model 5 in Table 
5) to calculate the inflection points for the quadratic specifications and 
find that the percentage of Hispanics in a city must grow to about 25.4 
percent or more than five times its median (or 4.9 percent) before the per 
capita number of officers starts to expand due to increases in this minority 
population. This result suggests that the percentage of Hispanics must go  
  
Table 5. Pooled Time-Series Models 4–6, Ln Police Officers per 100,000 in 
Large Cities 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
1 if 1990  .0147 .0168 .0081 .0158 .0085 .0213 
1 if 2000 .1294*** .0327 .1089*** .0319 .1124** .0387 
Real median income .0004* .0002 .0004* .0002 .0004 .0003 
Ln % unemployed  .0961*** .0292 .0786** .0296 .0822** .0311 
Segregation rate .0006 .0015 .0025* .0012 .0028* .0014 
Population / 106 .0189* .0087 .0185* .0081 .0195** .0082 
1 if city manager  -.1924** .0797 -.1616** .0630 -.1629** .0660 
Ln % black  .1381** .0523 .1471** .0513 .1550** .0545 
Ln % black in 1990  .0322** .0116 .0260* .0113 .0239* .0111 
Ln % black in 2000  .0783*** .0159 .0679*** .0149 .0655*** .0149 
% divorced  -.0721** .0297 -.0582* .0284 -.0626* .0285 
% divorced
2  .0043*** .0013 .0038*** .0012 .0040*** .0012 
% Hispanic  -.0108*** .0032 -.0097*** .0031 -.0079* .0040 
% Hispanic
2 .0002*** .0001 .0002*** .0001 .0002*** .0001 
Murder rate  -.0015 .0019 -.0020 .0019 -.0019 .0019 
Murder rate
2 .0001** .0000 .0001** .0000 .0001** .0000 
Ln % black  
   x segregation -.0021* .0012 -.0018* .0009 -.0017* .0010 
South x segregation — — -.0055*** .0016 -.0054*** .0016 
Ln poverty rate — — — — .0020 .0638 
Ln crowding — — — — -.0287 .0364 
Intercept  5.3288*** .2156 5.2922*** .2041 5.3179*** .2909 
R2 (corrected) .941***  .943***  .943***  
AIC -949  -964  -961  
Significance:  * < .05  ** < .01  *** < .001 (standard errors to the right of coefficients; 1-
tailed tests on all coefficients except the intercepts and period dummy 
variables; standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity). 
Note:  N = 373 city-years; coefficients on city dummies not shown 
 
beyond about the 87th percentile before this menace will produce 
additional police officers. Figure 1 provides a graphic depiction of this 
relationship using an augmented component plus residual plot (Mallows 
1986) with cubic splines to estimate the nonlinear fit.6 The equivalent 
 
 6. Augmented component plus residual plots probably give the most accurate picture 
of departures from linearity with all other effects held constant. To isolate this 
nonlinear relationship, the graph in Figure 1 is based on the specification in Model 
inflection point for the relationship between the divorce rate and police 
strength is about 7.6 percent, or a value about equal to the 10th percentile 
in the distribution of these city divorce rates. This association therefore 
becomes positive after divorce rates expand past a low threshold. Finally, 
the murder rates must grow to a point just below their mean (the mean 
murder rate is 16.1) or a rate of about 15.8 murders per 100,000 residents 
before the threat posed by increasingly substantial homicide rates starts to 
produce additional officers.  
 
Figure 1.  Hispanics in Cities and Police Officers per 100,000 (nonlinear fit 
estimated with a cubic spline; N = 373 city-years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The strength of some of the linear relationships we have detected is not 
trivial. If we use the point estimates from Model 5 in Table 5, these values 
suggest that the elimination of a city manager will lead to about thirty-five 
additional police officers with all other explanatory variables held at their 
means. This addition represents about a 15 percent increase in the mean 
number of officers in these cities.7 With all of the other explanatory 
 
5 without the squared percentage of Hispanics. 
 7. From 1980 to 2000 only two cities shifted from having or not having a city manager. 
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 variables held at their means in an equation not shown (in this equation 
we estimate the coefficients on all three period interactions rather than 
those on the main effect and two period interactions in the reported 
models), the point estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in 
the percentage of blacks in 2000 should lead to roughly eighty additional 
police officers per 100,000 city residents. 
Other plausible explanatory effects do not matter. Additional political 
or conflict effects such as the presence of a black mayor or the rate of 
black killings of whites do not explain the population standardized number 
of sworn officers. Alternative interactions such as those that assess 
Hispanic presence in the Southwest do not account for police strength.8 
The extensive controls that include both the case- and time-specific 
dummy variables, the many explanatory factors that are held constant, the 
substantial explanatory power of these equations, and the results of the 
diagnostic tests all imply that this analysis has uncovered the primary 
explanations for the population corrected number of police officers in 
large U.S. cities since 1981.9 
 
Wooldridge, however, states that fixed-effects models will provide accurate 
estimates even if only a modest amount of overtime variation in an explanatory 
variable is present (2002). The cross-sectional variation is far more substantial than 
the over-time variation in this city manager variable. Because random-effects 
models capture both over-time and cross-sectional variation, we ran such models to 
see if random-effects findings about the influence of city managers differ from the 
fixed-effects results we report, but they do not. Although the point estimates 
become less substantial in the random-effects models, the negative coefficient on 
the city manager variable remains highly significant. The fixed-effects estimates we 
report probably are more accurate than the random-effects alternatives as 
Hausman tests support a fixed- rather than random-effects approach. Note as well 
that the city-specific dummy variables in the fixed-effects models have substantial 
explanatory power. Both findings suggest that omitted variable bias may be present 
if random-effects models are used instead of fixed-effects. 
 8. Although it is unlikely due to the 10-year separation between cross-sections, serial 
correlation may be distorting the results. Most corrections for serial correlation in 
fixed-effects models remove the first cross-section. Such an analysis therefore 
would be restricted to cities in 1990 and 2000, but the statistical interactions we test 
require three periods. An alternative involves White period corrections to the 
standard errors (Lilien, 2004: 854). Because this method does not remove the first 
cross-section, when we re-estimate Models 5 and 6 using this procedure in Eviews 
5.1, we find that the same explanatory variables are statistically significant. 
 9. Residuals graphed on the fitted (or the predicted) scores show the appropriate 
random cloud of points with no discernable patterns. More specific graphs of 
residuals on each of the explanatory variables give appropriate results as well, save 
for occasional heteroskedasticity, but we eliminate this threat to the standard errors 
with the White correction. New York had the largest (but still reasonable) leverage 
score, but, due to that city's extreme size, that finding enhances the plausibility of 
these models. The models reported in Table 5 pass the Ramsey-Reset test for 
specification error. A variety of other diagnostic tests and graphs suggest that no 
CONCLUSIONS 
FINDINGS 
Most of the theoretical expectations that motivated this analyses have 
been supported. Although our main theoretical impetus led to a focus on 
the relationships between minority threat and law enforcement strength, 
the results are informative about other interesting explanations as well. 
Save for the first less than complete model, the results always show that 
population matters. As theoretical considerations and prior findings 
suggest, this evidence indicates that studies that analyze smaller cities 
(Greenberg et al. 1985) are not as likely to find relationships between 
minority threat and police strength. Explanations involving social 
disorganization, however, had mixed effects. Probably due to the large 
number of domestic violence calls that police departments must handle, 
higher divorce rates after a minimal threshold evidently produce 
additional officers. Yet neither poverty nor within dwelling unit crowding 
explains the population corrected number of sworn officers. 
Explanations borrowed from political science were corroborated as well. 
Many studies in this discipline have assessed the determinants of expensive 
public policies in U.S. states. These investigations almost always show that 
various measures of the tax base are strong determinants of such policies. 
Most of the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 support this account: the 
real median family income indicator of a city’s ability to support larger 
police departments was significant in four of the six models. This variable’s 
weak effect in the final model probably is due the high correlation between 
median income and the percentage below the poverty line, but it is 
noteworthy that the addition of the poverty indicator had no effects on the 
significance of other coefficients in that model. The results, however, offer 
more consistent support for another perhaps more interesting political 
effect. Cities with appointed (rather than elected) city managers economize 
by hiring fewer officers. This strong relationship proved robust despite the 
formidable controls included in these two-way fixed-effects models. The 
findings also do not contradict neo-Marxist explanations derived from the 
literature on punishment as the results in all models suggest that cities with 
higher unemployment rates had more officers. 
Although the aggregated property and violent crime rates did not 
explain variation in police strength, another more plausible crime related 
account was influential. After the association between the murder rates 
and police strength was specified so it could depart from linearity, another 
 
serious statistical problems are present in sufficient strength to cast doubt on the 
findings. 
threshold relationship surfaces. Increasingly substantial murder rates 
produced additional police officers only if the murder rates almost reached 
the mean for all cities. This result makes sense for several reasons. First, 
the murder rate counts in the Uniform Crime Reports probably are more 
accurately measured than the other crime rates enumerated in this source. 
Second, it is plausible that politically influential citizens would make 
successful political demands for additional officers after this most serious 
of all crimes expanded past a threshold and therefore became increasingly 
conspicuous. 
In light of the modest Hispanic populations in most U.S. cities but the 
large proportions in a few, we expected that the percentage of Hispanics 
would have to reach relatively high thresholds before the threat posed by 
this ethnic group would become substantial enough to produce additional 
officers. The results confirm this prediction as we find a positive 
relationship only after the percentage of Hispanics grew to beyond about 
25.4 percent, or slightly more than five times its median. Although this 
ethnic threat explanation always accounts for police strength, its effects in 
most cities are weaker than racial threat. Perhaps such contrasting results 
should not be surprising in light of the fiercely divisive, sometimes lethal 
disputes about race throughout U.S. history together with the modest 
Hispanic populations in the great majority of U.S. cities. If this minority 
group continues to expand at its current rapid rate, but assimilation does 
not keep pace with the growth, subsequent studies may find that the 
relationship between the threat posed by Hispanic presence and police 
strength may become increasingly pronounced and different in shape. 
The multiple findings about racial threat are not as simple. First, 
probably the most important finding concerns trends. The coefficients on 
the interactions with the period dummy variables show that the 
relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the per 
capita number of police officers has become stronger at least in the last 
two census years. We can conclude from such results that the law 
enforcement consequences of racial threat are not diminishing despite the 
purported progress in race relations since the civil rights era. The results 
instead suggest that the overall growth in mean department strength in 
these large cities since 1980 is at least partly due to the stronger 
relationships between racial threat and the expensive approach to social 
control provided by larger police departments. 
The results indicate that other theoretically interesting contingent 
effects are present as well. The negative effects of the interaction between 
African American presence and residential segregation suggest that fewer 
police officers can be expected when a substantial black population is 
residentially isolated from urban areas where whites reside. It follows 
from all of these results that larger black populations evidently produce 
more police officers, but when such populations are geographically 
isolated from white neighborhoods, they probably become less 
threatening. Such reductions in racial threat lead to an expectation that 
the per capita number of police officers should be reduced in the most 
segregated cities with larger African American populations, and that, of 
course, is exactly what we find. 
Finally, another contingent implication of the racial threat account is 
supported by the significant negative coefficients on the interaction 
between residential segregation and city location in the South. These 
results suggest that racial segregation sharply reduces police strength in 
this region, perhaps because the police in the South are more likely to 
assume that black citizens want less law enforcement. If this assumption is 
correct, officers would not be as likely to intervene in residentially 
segregated black neighborhoods (Wilson, 1971) and these cities would not 
need departments as large as cities with departments that aggressively 
police the ghetto. 
WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
In this study we have attempted to fill some important gaps in the 
literature on racial and ethnic threat and police strength. Because studies 
that assessed these threat effects were almost entirely cross-sectional and 
based on earlier data, recent shifts in the strength of threat accounts could 
not be assessed. Our approach probably produced findings that were more 
accurate in part because the statistical power necessary to detect 
interaction and nonlinear effects is enhanced when analyses are based on 
the larger number of cases made available by a panel design. And the two-
way fixed-effects estimators we use let us test interactions with the period 
dummy variables to discover whether statistically significant fluctuations 
in the strength of the relationship between racial threat and police 
strength have occurred. 
Such methodological refinements led to several other novel results that 
increase the plausibility of the racial threat account. First, we found 
several theoretically interesting nonlinear relationships that suggest that 
some explanatory variables must reach thresholds before they have effects 
on police strength. Second, one logical implication of the racial version of 
conflict theory is that in cities in which blacks are residentially separated 
from whites, majority white political demands for added police officers 
should be reduced. The supportive findings presented in this article also 
enhance the credibility of threat theory, especially when the relative 
number of police officers in large U.S. cities is at issue. 
But several caveats are necessary. First, our models are not designed to 
explain the number of police on the street. Majority whites in cities with 
larger and more threatening minority populations can successfully express 
their preferences for additional officers. Yet they cannot control how 
these additional officers will be used. Citizens have little information 
about the division of labor within their city’s department. In fact, a 
principal-agent relationship exists between citizens and their chief 
municipal political executive. Voters can support a political candidate who 
appears to be more likely than others to hire additional officers, but in 
most cities the mayor hires and fires the police executive who controls the 
department’s division of labor. These agent decisions cannot be readily 
observed by principals who only can vote or not vote for the mayor. In 
emergencies, of course, specialist officers who normally would not be on 
the streets can be used for this purpose. The population-corrected number 
of sworn officers is therefore a good indicator of a department’s total 
control capacity. And because there undoubtedly is a close association 
between the number police officers and the number of officers on the 
street, our results imply that explanations derived from threat theory 
should account for the number of officers on the street. Yet the need for 
three cross-sections imposed by our statistical models means that we must 
leave such questions about within department task allocations and the 
number of officers on patrol for another study.10 
Second, one disadvantage of a city-level approach concerns the absence 
of explanatory factors that intervene between the determinants we can 
assess and police strength. Such a difficulty is present in almost all studies 
of the relationships between racial threat and criminal justice outcomes 
(and in most other studies as well). Direct indicators of white political 
activity due to minority threat cannot be incorporated into a multiperiod 
multicity analysis like this because such indicators are unavailable. Other 
findings, however, make threat-based assumptions about the intervening 
links between minority presence and police strength difficult to dispute. 
We know that larger black populations in cities (Liska et al., 1982) or in 
neighborhoods (Quillian and Pager, 2001) produce enhanced fear of crime 
even after the crime rates have been held constant. We also know that 
whites act politically at least in part due to such fears and to resentments 
against minority street criminals because expansions in minority 
populations produce increased white votes for anti-minority candidates 
(Giles and Buckner, 1993; Giles and Hertz, 1994). Note as well that such 
candidates are invariably strong supporters of harsh law and order 
measures. Both considerations strongly suggest that increases in the size of 
minority populations produce expansions in the number of police officers 
 
 10. Data on the internal allocation of police tasks apparently only exists for these or 
equivalent departments in 1990 and in 2000. Yet as we state in note 8, largely due 
to the interaction effects we test, our models require data from 1980 as well as 
cross-sections in the latter two census years. 
because threatened whites make successful demands for such an outcome. 
We can infer from these supplemental findings that the links between 
minority threat and police strength are probably due to the intervening 
explanatory factors spelled out in the politically informed version of threat 
theory we test in this study. 
Probably the most important substantive conclusion, however, concerns 
the implications of the findings about racial effects. Robust results 
showing that there is an increasingly strong relationship between the 
presence of larger black populations and the number police officers in 
cities after many important explanatory effects have been held constant 
provide evidence about how important this minority threat explanation is, 
at least in a society with such a bitter history of racial conflict. In contrast 
to an optimistic view that racial threat is becoming less important, our 
findings suggest that this association is increasing in strength. The growth 
since 1980 in the association between African American presence and 
such an expensive form of social control suggests that the U.S. criminal 
justice system is still not color blind. Unfortunately, police strength in the 
United States continues to respond to racial and ethnic effects that should 
be irrelevant. 
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